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The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED POULSEN'S MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE CITY'S 
CASE-IN-CHIEF. 
a. Poulsen's Motion to Dismiss should have been granted 
by the trial court as there was not a prima facia case to submit 
to the jury. 
The applicable standard of review is under the abuse of 
discretion standard for legal determinations or clearly erroneous 
1 
for factual determinations. State v. 01senf 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 
1993); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 n. 5 (Utah 1994); State 
v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez. 817 
P.2d 774, 781-82 n. 3 (Utah 1991); State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188, 
192-93 (Utah 1990); Kunzler v. O'Dell. 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Ut. App. 
1993) . 
II 
WHETHER THE WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO FACTS AND THE LAW IN POULSEN'S CASE. 
a. Whether the language is so overbroad it prohibits 
lawful as well as unlawful conduct. 
The standard of review is for correctness and presents 
a question of law under a correction of error standard. State v. 
James. 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991); Provo Citv v. Wilden. 768 
P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); West Valley City v. Streeter. 849 P.2d 
613, 614 (Ut. App. 1993); City of Monticello v. Christensen. 788 
P.2d 513, 516 (Utah). 
Ill 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED POULSEN'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL IN LIGHT OF THE PREJUDICIAL REMARKS MADE BY THE 
CITY'S PROSECUTOR THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL AND REFERENCE TO MATTERS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION. 
a. Whether the jury instructions combined with the 
prosecutor and the courts misstatement of the law of strict 
2 
liability denied Poulsen a fundamentally fair trial. 
The standard of review is abuse of discretion as to legal 
conclusions and the rulings on admissibility of evidence as a 
question of law reviewed for correctness with a clearly erroneous 
standard for subsidiary factual findings. State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 
1377, 1380 (Ut. App. 1993); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 
1994); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Hay, 859 P.2d 1,6 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTION, STATUTORY AND RULE CONSTRUCTION 
THOUGHT TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES 
Utah State Const.. Art. I, Sec. 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(2)(4)(7) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Proc.. Rule 23 
Utah Rules of Criminal Proc., Rule 24 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 
West Valley City Ordinance, § 23-5-105 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On February 15, 1994, Poulsen was charged with 6 counts 
of Animals At Large, West Valley City Ordinance § 23-5-105 and 6 
counts of Nuisance Animals, West Valley City Ordinance § 23-5-101. 
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(R.26,27) 
During the course of the pretrial proceedings Poulsen 
filed several challenges to the constitutionality of ordinance 
(R.70,85) and claims of double jeopardy. (R.89) All Poulsen!s 
motions were summarily disposed by the trial court on June 23, 
1994, at pretrial conference. 
On July 5, 1994, prior to a jury being empaneled, Poulsen 
renewed her Motion to Dismiss on claims of double jeopardy, and 
constitutionality of the ordinance as applied. Six of the counts 
of Nuisance Animals were dismissed by the court on these grounds 
and Poulsen was tried on the remaining 6 counts of Animals at 
Large. 
After the city rested its case-in-chief, Poulsen moved 
the court for a directed verdict of dismissal based on the grounds 
the city had failed to prove an essential element of 
"responsibility" to the animals. (T.78-89) The court denied 
Poulsen's motion based on only part of the elements of the 
ordinance that charged a person with "care, custody, or control of 
Animals at Large". (T.90) 
The case was submitted to the jury and after deliberation 
returned with 4 verdicts of guilty and 2 acquittals. (R. 157-168) 
Poulsen timely filed a Motion for Arrest of Judgment (R. 180-192) 
and a Motion for a New Trial. (R.214-219, 238-241, 259-275) An 
order denying Poulsen1s motions was entered on August 22, 1994. 
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(R.276, 314-316) Poulsen filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial 
court on August 30, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
West Valley City officers were dispatched by Salt Lake 
County deputies to help contain 6-8 horses running at large between 
the boundaries of West Valley City and Magna area on February 15, 
1994, at 1;30 A.M. (T.16) The horses bolted and ran North down 7200 
West to 2100 South freeway where they turned West and went into 
some tall grass where the officers lost sight of them. (T.19, 22-
23, 28) 
Poulsen and her daughter spotted the loose horses and 
opened a gate to a pasture on 2100 South and approximately 7700 
West, where the officers assisted Poulsen in containing the horses. 
After the horses were contained, Salt Lake County deputies departed 
and only the West Valley City officers remained. (T.24-26, 29, 33, 
38-39) 
West Valley City officer Stan Larsen (Larsen) approached 
Poulsen after she had closed the gate and asked her if she was the 
owner of the horses. Poulsen stated that she was not the owner of 
the horses but did know the owner of the horses. Larsen then told 
Poulsen by closing the gate she "assumed charge, care, custody, and 
control of the horses". He also told her that the animals should 
be impounded. (T.42-43) However, Larsen tacitly consented for 
Poulsen to keep the horses there the night. 
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Poulsenfs daughter, age approximately 20, was also on the 
scene, and while the officers were talking to Poulsen, the daughter 
hopped on one of the horses (not one identified by the officers as 
loose) and rode it to the back of the field. Poulsen's daughter 
also took a bag of feed out of her car and fed the horses. (T.43-
45) 
Poulsen told the officers that the horses could stay in 
the area for the night (T.105) because it was snowing (T.53) and 
she didn't believe the officers could catch the animals without an 
incident. (T.105) Poulsen also expressed concern that one of the 
officers might be hurt by trying to catch the blind horse or the 
one that kicked. (T.71-72) So the officers authorized Poulsen to 
keep the animals for the night. (T.106-107) 
Larsen then told Poulsen he was going to issue her a 
citation for the animals being loose and asked Poulsen for her 
name, address, and phone number which Poulsen gave him. 
(T.50,97,103) 
Larsen then asked Poulsen for some identification which 
she looked through her purse for a while but was unable to locate 
her identification cards. (T.49) However, officer Presbrey 
eventually went through Poulsen !s purse and did find identification 
cards with Poulsenfs name on them. (T.100-101) 
Larsen then asked Poulsen to produce a drivers license. 
(T.49) When Poulsen couldn't produce a drivers license, Larsen 
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asked Poulsen for her date of birth which Poulsen refused to give 
Larsen, stating it was against her religious belief to use a birth 
date. (T.51) 
Poulsen was then arrested for failing to identify herself 
and taken to Salt Lake County jail. (T.113,139-140) 
Poulsen was charged with 6 counts of Animals at Large 
under West Valley City Ordinance § 23-5-105 and 6 counts of 
Nuisance Animals under West Valley City Ordinance § 23-5-101. 
(R.26-27) Numerous motions to dismiss on various grounds were heard 
and denied by the trial court on June 23, 1994. 
On July 5, 1994, prior to the empaneling the jury, 
Poulsen renewed her motions to dismiss on unconstitutionality of 
ordinance, double jeopardy, and jurisdiction. The trial court 
dismissed the 6 counts of Animal Nuisance charges on these grounds. 
After the jury was empaneled the city improperly stated to the jury 
in opening statement that Poulsen was the owner of the animals. 
(T.7) 
During the city's Officer Coxs' testimonmy and the only 
one who saw the horses in West Valley City, he testified he did not 
know who the owner of the horses was, as he'd left that up to the 
animal control officers. (T.28-29) 
Larsen testified that he only "assumed" Poulsen was the 
owner because she was there that night but had no knowledge of who 
the actual owner of the horses was (T.64) and stated it was not his 
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job to find out who owned the horses as they were "county animals11. 
(T.65)1 
The city brought up the issue of Poulsen's drivers 
license status and Poulsen objected to the relevancy which was 
overruled by the court (T.46). 
Again the city brought up that Poulsen didn't have a 
drivers license and Poulsen objected as no vehicle stop was 
involved. The city stated that it went to Poulsen's ability to tell 
the truth. (T.50) However, Poulsen never placed her character into 
issue. 
After the city presented their case-in-chief, Poulsen 
moved for dismissal for the city's failure to prove the essential 
element of "allow" and "responsibility" to the horses and for the 
city's prejudicial remarks about Poulsen's drivers license status. 
(T.78-88) 
Further, the city never did dispute that the horses were 
owned by a Mr. Rokich and the only facts the city had proven were 
as follows: (1) West Valley City Officers chased down some horses 
(2) the offense had occurred in West Valley City (3) the horses 
arrived at a pasture with a gate on it (4) the defendant and her 
daughter are at the pasture (5) defendant repairs a gate (6) 
In a jurisdictional hearing and also throughout discovery 
Poulsen had requested to see the contractual agreement between the 
city and the county for animal control as provided for in U.C.A. 
§ 4-25-2 (1982). 
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daughter has a bag of food in her car (7) daughter rides one of the 
horses (not identified as one that was loose) (8) defendant knows 
one horse kicks and one horse is blind. (T.85-86) 
The trial court denied Poulsenfs Motion to Dismiss on the 
grounds that no legal duty needed to be proven, just "charge, care, 
custody, and control". (T.90) 
At closing arguments the city prosecutor made several 
prejudicial comments concerning matter outside the elements of the 
charges against Poulsen. (T.158,160,170-171) The city prosecutor 
also stated several times that Poulsen had a burden to present 
evidence against the city. Also that only the city's witnesses were 
to be believed and not Poulsenfs witnesses. However, Poulsen's 
witnesses had not been impeached by the city. (T.156,171-172) 
The city also misstated the law regarding strict 
liability offenses and asked the trial court to also misinstruct 
the jury with regard to strict liability offenses. (T.155,157,168-
169) The jury returned 4 counts of guilty and 2 counts of 
acquittal. 
Poulsen filed two post trial motions prior to sentencing 
for Arrest of Judgment and for a New Trial, both were denied by the 
court on August 22, 1994. The court imposed a fine, surcharge, 
restitution and probation and 30 days in jail against Poulsen. 
Poulsen filed a Motion for a New Trial and to Vacate 
sentence which was denied by the court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The trial court should have granted Poulsenfs motion for 
dismissal at the close of the city's case in chief for the city's 
failure to prove the essential element of "allowing" or being 
"responsible" for the horses to run at large. 
The trial court should have also granted Poulsen's motion 
for Arrest of Judgment on the grounds that the facts so proven by 
the city did not constitute a public offense. 
POINT II 
The language of the ordinance in the case at bar is 
unconstitutional as applied to Poulsen. When the city stated they 
did not need to prove that Poulsen had a legal relationship to the 
horses, it shifted the burden of production to Poulsen to prove her 
innocence. This is fundamentally unfair and denied Poulsen the 
constitutional right to have the city prove all the elements 
against her beyond reasonable doubt. 
Also the conduct of one having "charge, care, custody or 
control" of animals is overbroad and describes lawful as well as 
unlawful conduct minus the element of legal duty. The language of 
the ordinance is overbroad in describing the conduct prohibited 
which is a protectable conduct of one who is entitled to have 
charge, care, custody, or control of horses. 
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POINT III 
The trial court improperly overruled Poulsen's objections 
to the city's continuous references to Poulsen's driving license 
status. Poulsen was not charged with giving false information to 
an officer nor driving without a license and the remarks that 
Poulsen "lied" about her drivers license were prejudicial in having 
the jury consider matters outside the case. There is no logical 
connection between not having a drivers license and having or not 
having "charge, care, custody, or control" of horses at large. The 
city's remarks concerning Poulsen's reluctance to admit or confess 
to any possible criminal offenses was prejudicial wherein Poulsen 
has a constitutional privilege to not incriminate herself. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED POULSEN'S MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE CITY'S 
CASE-IN-CHIEF. 
After West Valley City had presented its case-in-chief 
Poulsen moved for dismissal or a directed verdict of acquittal for 
the city's failure to prove the essential element of 
"responsibility" or a legal duty owed by Poulsen to the animals. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 gives the following definitions used in 
criminal cases: 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose 
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criminal responsibility is in issue 
in a criminal action. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act 
when there is a legal duty to act 
and the actor is capable of acting" 
(1989). 
Animals at Large essentially means that the owner or 
other person responsible omitted to containing their animals and 
had a legal duty to do so. The city stated that they had proven 
that the animals were out in West Valley City and that Poulsen 
closed a gate and by virtue of that single act was thereby 
"assuming charge, care, custody, or control of the animals", (T.42-
43) void of any duty to keep the animals contained. 
However, according to all the elements of the city's 
ordinance Poulsen had to "allow" the horses to run at large. 
"The use in the pleadings of the word "allow" 
implied that the Defendant was sufficiently in 
control, ownership, or possession of the [dog] 
as to be chargeable with regulation of his 
conduct.... The word is synonymous with 
"permit".... When used in conjunction with a 
statute charging a duty to the owner... to 
regulate his activities, connotes a positive 
duty, failure to perform which would violate 
the ordinance. 1 ALR 4th 994[b]. 
The meanings of words like "allow" in statutory 
construction, are to be construed "under the common definition of 
those terms." Hornsby v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop. 758 P.2d 
929 (Utah App. 1988). This court stated that "allow" means to 
sanction, permit, acknowledge, approve of" Id. at 935 [quoting 
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Santanello v. Cooper, 106 Ariz. 262, 475 P.2d 245 (1970)]. In 
Santanello, the Arizona Supreme Court specified that: 
HThe word HallowM means to approve of, to 
sanction, to permit, to acknowledge. Webster's 
3rd International, unabridged (1961). So 
defined, HallowM requires some degree of 
knowledge, either actual or constructive, on 
the part of the dog owner that his dog is at 
large;...". Id. at 250. 
In Neztosie v. Mever, 883 P.2d 920 (Utah 1994) the 
Supreme Court gave the following definition concerning the term 
"keeper" of an animal and found the words "custody, management, and 
control intrinsic to the following definition": 
"...the exercise of a substantial number of 
incidents of ownership by one who, though not 
the owner assumes to act in his stead. • • 
undertakes to manage, control or care for 
it... as owners in general are accustomed to 
do" (emphasis added)• 
This means more than merely checking to see if [an 
animal] has sufficient food and water for a time. See McEvoy v. 
Brown, 150 N.E. 2d 652,656 (111. App. Ct. 1958). Poulsen only 
offered to contain the horses for the night as it was dark, snowing 
and for the safety of the officers. (T.72-73) There was no evidence 
that Poulsen owed a legal duty to the animals nor was Poulsen the 
legal cause of their being loose. Neither did Poulsen have prior 
knowledge of the horses being at large, therefore she did not 
"allow" them to "run at large" nor whould she sanction such an act. 
Poulsen properly moved for dismissal after the city^ 
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case-in-chief as to whether Poulsen was the legal cause of the 
horses being loose which was a question of law and one for the 
court to decide. Am. Jur. 57A 2d. § 446 p.428. 
"When a Motion for a Directed Verdict is made 
at the close of the states case, the court 
should dismiss the charge if the state did not 
establish a prima facia case against the 
defendant by producing believable evidence of 
all the elements of the crime charged.H State 
v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) (emphasis 
added)• 
a. Poulsenvs Motion to Dismiss should have been granted 
by the trial court as there was not a prima facia case to submit 
to the jury. 
"In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to 
send case to [the] jury, [the] court uses same standard for [the] 
claim of insufficient evidence to support jury verdict.11 State v. 
Tavlor, 884 P.2d 1293-94 (Ut. App. 1994). 
A Motion for Arrest of Judgment is proper when "the facts 
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense...". Ut. R. 
Cr. Procedure, Rule 23. The city never proved a prior legal duty 
Poulsen owed to the loose horses. In fact, the city requested the 
court to misstate the law with regard to strict liability offenses 
stating that the city need not have to prove a legal duty. (T.168-
169) "A judgment may be arrested based on an insufficiency of the 
evidence or facts as proved in trial or as admitted by the 
parties." State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Ut. App. 1991), aff'd, 
14 
852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
In light of the cityfs admission that it did not need to 
prove a [legal] duty, the trial court should have granted Poulsen's 
Motion for an Arrest of Judgment as this was a necessary element 
to prove a public offense had been committed. 
POINT II 
WHETHER THE WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO FACTS AND THE LAW IN POULSENfS CASE 
Poulsen contends that West Valley City Ordinance as 
applied to Poulsen shifted the burden of proving the animals were 
not in her "charge, care, custody, or control11, thus destroying the 
constitutional protection of the presumption of innocence as 
provided for in Ut. Code Ann. § 76-1-501 as follows: 
"(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each 
element of the offense charged against 
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted. 
(2) ...[Element[s] of the offense" mean[s]: 
(a) The conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden 
in the definition of the offense;" 
(emphasis added). 
The West Valley City Ordinance clearly states ... "or the 
person charged with the responsibility". The city admitted they did 
not talk to the owner of the horses nor even asked the owner if 
Poulsen had a legal responsibility for the horses. (T.85) In fact 
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the city stated all it had to prove was that the incident happened 
and Poulsen was there (T.155-157) The city's only reference to any 
responsibility to the animals was when Poulsen told the officers 
she would be responsible to see that the horses stayed contained 
for the night (T.107,120). The horses were not "at large" at that 
point, the city even admitted that they didn't know where the 
horses had gotten loose from. (T.69) 
a. Whether the language is so overbroad it prohibits 
lawful as well as unlawful conduct. 
The ordinance as applied to Poulsen is a violation of the 
due process clause of the Ut. St. Const. Art. I, Sec. 7, with the 
ordinance being overbroad in its application to lawful conduct as 
well as unlawful. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
"Statutory overbreadth... is a substantive due 
process question which addresses the issue of 
whether "the statute in question is so broad 
that it may not only prohibit unprotected 
behavior but may also prohibit 
constitutionally protected activity as well". 
State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 
1987). 
It is just as legal and lawful to have charge, care, 
custody or control of horses as it would be unlawful conduct if a 
person were liable for the animals and they escaped. "A criminal 
statute is overbroad when it in a substantial way prohibits lawful 
act as well as unlawful acts". State v. Haicr, 578 P.2d 837 (Utah 
1978) . 
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The court simply ignored the plain wording of the 
ordinance and found that the city only had to prove "charge, care, 
custody, or control" of the animals in one specific isolated 
context. The "[t]erm "run at large" in relation to domestic animals 
does not normally mean that animal is found on property of neighbor 
in an isolated instance...". Christo v. People, 19 N.Y. 2d 678 
(N.Y. 1967) . The city's ordinance as applied in this way to Poulsen 
has shifted an unreasonable burden upon Poulsen to prove a negative 
in a criminal action, which is in violation of Poulsen's 
constitutional protections to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty. 
POINT III 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED POULSENfS MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL IN LIGHT OF THE PREJUDICIAL REMARKS MADE BY THE 
CITY'S PROSECUTOR THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL AND REFERENCE TO MATTERS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE JURYfS CONSIDERATION. 
During the course of the trial the city continuously made 
references to Poulsen's drivers license status. These remarks were 
objected to by Poulsen on the grounds of relevancy, and was 
overruled by the court. (T.46,49-50,110-112) The city stated the 
grounds for getting into Poulsen's drivers license status was 
because it was Poulsen "who wanted to get into the arrest and what 
occurred" (T.46) and Poulsen's "tendency to tell the truth 
"(T.49-50) 
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The rules pertaining to relevancy are expressly set forth 
concerning matters of the accused character. "Evidence of a persons 
character or trait of character is not admissible for the purpose 
of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except (1) ...offered by the accused...". UT. R. EVID. 404. Poulsen 
did not ever place her truthfulness in issue at trial for the city 
to have brought Poulsen's drivers license status to light. 
"By offering witnesses as to his reputation as a truthful 
person, defendant opens the door for the prosecution to impeach his 
character witnesses. State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah 1981). 
Poulsen never offered any witness testimony concerning her 
reputation to tell the truth. This remark played a significant part 
in prejudicing the jurors against Poulsen and had nothing to do 
with the charges. 
In closing argument the city improperly asked the jury 
to consider remarks about Poulsen1s refusal to produce a drivers 
license, stating that Poulsen's reluctance to admit to not having 
a license constituted Poulsen being a "deceptive person", 
(T.160,170) "playing games" with the police officers. (T.158) It 
had been brought to the courts attention that these remarks were 
improper. (T.84,86) Further, if Poulsen was driving without a 
license, it could be a criminal act and Poulsen had a 
constitutional right not to volunteer any admissions to the 
officers. 
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These remarks were clearly made for the sole purpose of 
prejudicing the jury against Poulsen. The remarks of the city in 
the case at bar and State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 782, 784-86 (Utah 
1992) are analogous in that in Emmett, the prosecution suggested 
to the jurors that Emmett was the type of person who "took 
advantage of his own family member[s]ff [referring to victim of 
previous forgery] and that "he did it again"... clearly urged the 
jury to view Emmett as a person who commits crime against his 
family" and to use this characteristic as evidence that Emmett 
sodomized his son" Id. at 785-86. In Poulsen's case, the city 
continuously made references to Poulsen's reluctance to confess to 
police officers that she didn't have a drivers license to prove she 
had charge, care, custody, and control of animals that were loose. 
"Generally, the test used for determining whether a prosecutors 
statements are improper and constitute error is whether the remarks 
"called to the jurors1 attention matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in reaching a verdict." Improper remarks 
require reversal when they are harmful. Id. at 785 [quoting. State 
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987)]. "The test for 
determining an error's harmfulness is whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that absent the error a different result would have 
occurred". Id. at 784. See, e.g. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 781, 789 
(Utah 1991) . The Court in Emmett also held that "this determination 
should be made on the basis of the record as a whole. 
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In the instant case, the determination is best made by 
viewing this error in conjunction with other errors which occurred 
during the trial, specifically, instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct." Id. at 784-85. This impropriety was objected to by 
Poulsen throughout the trial and when she argued her Motion to 
Dismiss after the cityfs case-in-chief. The trial court should have 
been fully aware of its harmfulness as it was obvious that the 
remarks were for no other purpose than to prejudice Poulsen from 
having a fair trial. Rule 404(b) expressly state, "Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith". Given the blatant irrelevant comments of the prosecutor 
in Poulsen's case it should have been obvious to the court that the 
prosecutors remarks called to the jurors matters they were not 
"justified in considering" Emmett at 786. 
a* Whether the jury instructions combined with the 
prosecutor and the courts misstatement of the law of strict 
liability denied Poulsen a fundamentally fair trial. 
The trial court failed to give the jury the proper 
elements instruction concerning what the city had to prove against 
Poulsen beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Addendum) (T.152) Instead, 
the court gave a informational jury instruction which did not 
clearly define the cityfs burden to prove all the elements against 
Poulsen. (T.152) A trial courts failure to give accurate elements 
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in a jury instruction will be reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Jones, 823 P.2d 1059,1061 (Utah 1991). "Jury instructions to which 
a party failed to object will not be reviewed absent manifest 
injustice". State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Ut. App. 1994) 
[quoting Ut. R. Cr. Proc. , Rule 19(c) and State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 
1201,1203 (Ut. App 1991)]. 
This court overturned the conviction in Jones for the 
very same error Poulsen is presenting before the court now. Because 
Poulsen brought the issue of the cityfs failure to carry its burden 
to prove these elements before the court at her Motion to Dismiss 
and in her closing arguments, the court improperly instructed the 
jury with regard to strict liability offenses and requires reversal 
for manifest injustice. 
Had the proper instruction been given to the jury, then 
the wording in the ordinance of "allow" and "responsibility" would 
have made it clear to the jury that the city did indeed need to 
prove that Poulsen had a legal duty to keep the horses from 
escaping. Further, the very use of the wording "allow" and 
responsible" as used in the ordinance negates any intention to 
create strict liability for violation of the ordinance. Santanello, 
at 252. 
However, even though Poulsen pointed this scienter 
requirement out to the court several times, and moved to dismiss 
the charges, the court ignored the wording of the ordinance and 
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allowed the city prosecutor to misstate the law of strict liability 
to the jury. (T.169) "Whether proceeding under a strict liability 
or negligence theory, proximate cause is a necessary element of the 
Plaintiff's case". Am. Jur. 57A 2d. § 442 p.424). 
"[P]roximate cause is not an affirmative defense to be 
specially plead; it is a requirement of the Plaintiff's cause of 
action and is put at issue by a general denial". Am. Jur. 57A 2d. 
§ 439 p.422. 
CONCUJSION 
Poulsen respectfully requests that the Appellate court 
reverse the convictions and judgment against Poulsen and either 
vacate judgment or reverse for a new trial since the city did not 
prove the element of "allow" and "responsible" in the city's case. 
It is for this reason that the trial court plainly erred in not 
granting Poulsen a new trial on the city's charges. The ordinance 
was unconstitutionally applied to Poulsen. Poulsen contends that 
manifest injustice is what the prosecutors comments cumulatively 
misled the jury to believe. The cumulative effect of the 
prosecutors prejudicial comments and misstating the elements of the 
ordinance and irrelevant comments caused manifest injustice and 
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Utah State Const., Art. I Sec. 7. 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law.H 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401. 
"Single criminal episode11 defined -
Joinder of offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a 
different definition, "single criminal 
episode19 means all conduct which is closely 
related in time and is incident to an attempt 
or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed 
to limit or modify the effect of Section 77-
21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses 
and defendants in criminal proceedings" 
(1975). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. 
"Separate offenses arising out of singe 
criminal episode - Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal actio for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall 
establish offenses which may be punished 
in different way under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision; 
an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a 
prosecution under any other such 
provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate 
offenses under a single criminal episode, 
unless the court otherwise orders to 
promote justice, a defendant shall not be 
subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
(a) the offenses are within the 
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jurisdiction of a single court# and 
(b) The offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the 
offense charged and the included offense. 
An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission 
of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense 
charged or an offense otherwise 
included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included 
offense. 
The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a 
rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. 
If the district court on motion after 
verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall 
determine that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for the 
offense charged but that there is 
sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and 
the trier of fact necessarily found every 
fact required for conviction of that 
included offense, the verdict or judgment 
of conviction may be set aside or 
reversed and a judgment of conviction 
entered for the included offense, without 
necessity of a new trial, if such relief 
is sought by the defendant (1974)• 
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Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-501. 
Presumption of innocence - "Element of the 
offense" defined. 
N(l) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each 
element of the offense charged against 
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element 
of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden 
in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue 
are not preponderance of the evidence 
(1973). 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-601(2)(4) (7) . 
Definitions. 
"Unless otherwise provided, the following 
terms apply to this title: 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose 
criminal responsibility is in issue 
in a criminal action. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act 
when there is a legal duty to act 
and the actor is capable of acting" 
(1989). 
Utah Rules of Criminal Proc., Rule 23. 
"At any time prior to the imposition of 
sentence, the Court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall 
arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense or 
the defendant is mentally ill, or there is 
other good cause for the arrest of judgment.". 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Proc, Rule 24. 
Motion for new trial. 
"(a) The court may, upon motion of a 
party or upon its own initiative, 
grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a 
party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be 
made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by 
affidavits or evidence of the 
essential facts in support of the 
motion. If additional time is 
required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the 
hearing on the motion for such time 
as it deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be 
made within 10 days after imposition 
of sentence, or within such further 
time as the court may fix during the 
ten-day period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party 
shall be in the same position as if 
no trial had been held and the 
former verdict shall not be used or 
mentioned either in evidence or in 
argument. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401. 
"Definition of "relevant evidence" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence". 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 402. 
"Relevant evidence generally admissible; 
irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, 
except as otherwise provided by the 
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constitution of the Unites States or the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or 
by these rules, or by other rules applicable 
in courts of this state. Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible". 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403. 
"Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence". 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404. 
"Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of 
a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving actin in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, 
except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution 
to rebut the same; 
(2) character of victim. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of the crime offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a 
character trait of peacefulness of 
the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to 
rebut evidence that the victim was 
the first aggressor; 
(3) character of witness. Evidence of 
the character of a witness, as 
provided in rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
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admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident" 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992) . 
West Valley City Ordinance, § 23-5-105. 
"It shall be unlawful for the owner or person 
having charge, care, custody or control of any 
animal to allow such animal at any time to run 
at large. The owner or person charged with 
responsibility for an animal found running at 
large shall be strictly liable for a violation 
of this section regardless of the precautions 
taken to prevent the escape of the animal and 
regardless of whether or not he knows that the 
animal is running at large." 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
POULSEN, LYNN CASE NO: 941000493 
3660 S 7236 W DOB: 05/17/53 
MAGNA UT 84044 TAPE: COUNT: 
DATE: 08/03/94 
CITATION: , 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 500.00 Susp: 250.00 
Jail: 3 0 DA Susp: 30 DA ACS: 50 HR 
COMMUNITY SERVICE IN LIEU OF FINE. 
Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE 
Plea: Find: Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE 
Plea: Find: Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE 
Plea: Find: Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE 
Plea: Find: Not Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE 
Plea: Find: Not Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
.Tail* O 55usn: 0 ACS: 0 
POULSEN, LYNN CASE NO: 941000493 PAGE 
Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 
Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 
Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 




Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 
Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
ACS: 
ACS: 
Trust Category: Restitution 
Paid: 
Name: WEST VALLEY CITY 
Address: 3 600 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
Address: POLICE CASE #94-832 & 94-6941 
City/State/Z ip: 
0.00 Due: 500.00 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 










PROBATION TERMS & CONDITIONS: 
12 MO PROB W/COURT TERMS: 1. NO OTHER VIOLATIONS 2. TIMELY 
PAYMENT OF RESTITUTION BY 6/3/95 3. HORSE PROPERTY TO BE 
PROPERLY FENCED OR NO HORSES PRESENT 4. VERIFICATION OF 
COMPLETION OF COMMUNITY SERVICE WITH CHARITY OF CHOICE BY 
2/3/95 
POULSEN, LYNN CASE NO: 941000493 PAGE 3 
CALENDAR: 
SENTENCING 08/03/94 02:00 PM in rm 3 with WILLIAM B BOHLING 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Chrg: DOG AT LARGE Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju 
Fine Amount: 500.00 Suspended: 250.00 
Jail: 30 DAYS Suspended: 30 DAYS 
Community Service: 50 HOURS in lieu of fine. 
CREATE Trust A/R # 01 Restitution 500.00 
IT IS ADJUDGED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF FOUR COUNTS OF 
ANIMAL AT LARGE, A CLASS "B" MISD, BASED UPON A GUILTY VERDICT 
BY A JURY. JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED DATED THIS 3RD DAY OF 
AUGUST 1994. 
BY THE C06RX.^V. ^ V.NVC «.% 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 
/Wni ./ 
"CIRCUIT CJ3UHw oyOS&Qf£ /7 
DATED ______ L> ^- —^ 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 




ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT 
AND SENTENCE AND FOR A NEW 
TRIAL 
CASE NO. 941000493 
The court having considered the parties briefs and oral 
arguments on these matters, and for the reasons set forth by 
the court on the record on August 22, 1994, and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE IS 
DENIED; 
2. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS DENIED. 
Dated this 22nd day of August, 1994 
• # * • • " « • * -
BY THB 
^^mr**** 
INSTRUCTION NO . It) 
The Defendant is charged with the crimes in Counts 1-6, of 
"ANIMAL RUNNING AT LARGE", in violation of Section 23-5-102, West 
Valley city Ordinance, a Class "B" misdemeanor. 
Before you find the Defendant guilty of the crime of Animal 
Running at Large, you must find from the evidence, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the following elements of that crime: 
That on or about the 15th day of 
February, 1994; 
2. In West Valley City; — — 
3. The Defendant, Lynn Poulsen; ^
-
4. had charge, cars^-jsis^ody or control of 
any animal andrallowec^such animal to 
run at large; ^ — J 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of 
the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your 
duty to find the Defendant guilty. On the other hand, if the 
evidence has failed to so establish one or more of said elements, 
then you should fine the Defendant not guilty. 
